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ABSTRACT 
Strategic Information Acquisition and the Mitigation of Global Warming   
by Florian Morath * 
We consider the strategic role of uncertainty and information acquisition for the 
mitigation of global warming which is modeled using a standard framework for 
private provision of a public good. Prior to the voluntary contribution 
mechanism, we allow for investments in information about the country-specific 
benefit of reductions of the emissions of greenhouse gases. We show that 
information acquisition has a substantial strategic value in the following 
interaction. Countries may prefer not to learn their valuation of the public good 
even if information acquisition does not involve a direct cost. This strategic 
information choice may further decrease the efficiency of the public good 
provision.   
 
Keywords: Private provision of public goods, environmental public goods, information 
acquisition, uncertainty, global warming 
JEL Classification: H41, D83, Q54 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Strategische Informationsakquise und der Kampf gegen den Klimawandel  
Diese Arbeit untersucht die strategische Bedeutung von Unsicherheit und Infor-
mationsakquise für den Kampf gegen den Klimawandel, der im Standard-
rahmen der privaten Bereitstellung eines öffentlichen Gutes abgebildet wird. 
Bevor die Beiträge zum öffentlichen Gut auf freiwilliger Basis gewählt werden, 
haben Länder die Möglichkeit, in Information über den länderspezifischen 
Nutzen einer Reduzierung der CO2-Emissionen zu investieren. Es wird gezeigt, 
dass der Informationsakquise ein substantieller strategischer Wert in der nach-
gelagerten Interaktion zukommt. Selbst wenn durch die Informationsakquise 
keine direkten Kosten anfallen, können Länder es vorziehen, ihre Bewertung 
des öffentlichen Gutes nicht zu erfahren. Diese strategische Informations-
entscheidung kann die Effizienz der Bereitstellung des öffentlichen Gutes 
zusätzlich beeinträchtigen. 
 
                                                 
*  I thank Benny Geys, Johannes Münster, Julio Robledo, and, in particular, Kai A. Konrad for valuable 
comments and suggestions.  
 
 
1 Introduction
Global warming and the reduction of emissions of carbon dioxide have been
among the most intensively debated issues in international politics in the last
decade. Recently, the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change has
added to the numerous attempts to assess the costs and benefits of climate
policy. Both there and in many other discussions of this topic, the relevance
of uncertainty for taking action for climate protection is emphasized.1 But
reducing uncertainty is not the only aim of research on the impact of cli-
mate change. Investment in information can also be used as an instrument
in international climate policy. Assuming that a large part of the research
is publicly funded, the huge number of publications on climate change may
serve as indicative of the importance of information. One kind of uncer-
tainty still relates to the quantitative relationship between the accumulation
of greenhouse gases and global temperatures. However, in addition to this
more general question, most of the countries involved in climate policy are
financing specific research programs to examine the impact of climate change
at the national level. In this context, the focus of information acquisition is
on the country-specific costs and benefits of a global rise in temperatures as
well as on the costs relative to other countries. Some countries, however,
might prefer not to acquire information about this cost.
The mitigation of global warming is one of the most important examples
for the private provision of a (pure) public good.2 The possibility of free-
riding gives countries an incentive to influence their strategic position in the
interaction. Manipulation of individual characteristics may serve as a com-
mitment device: it may establish the possibility of a credible commitment to
free ride. But in return, such manipulations are likely to lower the eﬃciency
of the outcome of the interaction.
In this paper, we focus on the strategic role of information acquisition.
Finding out that the individual benefit of the mitigation of global warming is
large could reduce the contributions of other countries and shift the burden
1Cf. Stern (2006), chapters 2, 13, 14, 21. Furthermore, see e.g. McKibbin and Wilcoxen
(2002) or Sandler (2004) who points out that, compared to the case of ozone-shield deple-
tion, unresolved uncertainties inhibit the reduction of CO2 emissions.
2See e.g. Hoel (1991) and Sandler (1992, 2004) for an analysis of global climate as a
public good, Caplan et al. (1999) for a model where countries are aﬀected diﬀerently by
global warming, and for empirical studies Murdoch and Sandler (1997), Murdoch et al.
(1997), and Fredriksson and Gaston (2000).
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of provision of the public good to the country itself. Hence, investments in
information do not only eliminate uncertainty and improve the eﬃciency of
the own contribution. Additional information will also aﬀect the behavior of
other countries.
In order to elaborate on the incentives for information acquisition, we
stay as close as possible to the standard model for the private provision of
a public good. However, we extend this framework by including an infor-
mation decision. We assume that, ex ante, countries are uncertain about the
economic value they attach to a reduction of CO2 emissions. Before the
contributions to the public good are chosen, countries can decide whether or
not to invest in information about this country-specific value. An important
characteristic of our model consists in the observability of the information
acquisition: additional information acquired by a country is publicly observ-
able before the countries enter into the private provision game. On the one
hand, this specification highlights most explicitly the strategic character of
investments in information. On the other hand, observability of information
acquisition reflects the fact that reports estimating the economic value of
global warming at a national level are typically published by the research
institutes conducting the studies. For the case of international public goods,
it is likely that information acquired by a government cannot easily be kept
secret, and thus, observability of information is a reasonable assumption. In
this paper, we rule out the possibility of acquiring information about the
benefits to other countries. The strategic eﬀect of this type of information
acquisition is similar to the eﬀect that occurs in our model.3
We will identify two eﬀects of information acquisition. Additional infor-
mation allows for an adjustment of the individual contribution. Although
this eﬀect increases the individual payoﬀ, countries have to take into account
the reaction of the other countries in the private provision game: knowing
about a high valuation of a country, they may reduce their own contribution.
We analyze this trade-oﬀ and show that additional information may have
a negative value even if the cost of this information is zero. Thus, antici-
pating the impact of the information on other countries’ behavior, countries
may have an incentive to remain uninformed. If, in equilibrium, informa-
tion is not acquired due to strategic considerations, welfare may be lower
3One could imagine that some countries try to manipulate information and produce
information in their favor. This type of activity, however, is excluded from our model
because we are aiming at the strategic value of being uninformed.
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than under complete information. We will determine conditions under which
the strategic information choice negatively aﬀects the eﬃciency of the public
good provision. But in addition, we demonstrate that there can be too much
information acquisition from a welfare point of view even if the information
is available without cost. In the latter case, uncertainty helps to overcome
the underprovision problem.
Our analysis builds on the standard model of private provision of a public
good that has been intensively studied in the literature. Among the main
contributions are McGuire (1974), Warr (1982, 1983), Cornes and Sandler
(1984, 1985), Bergstrom et al. (1986), and Andreoni (1988). Andreoni and
McGuire (1993) describe the set of contributors based on the individually
optimal supply of the public good. Sandler et al. (1987) indicate the role of
uncertainty by showing that increased risk with regard to the contributions
of the other players may make free-riding behavior worse.
Within the context of voluntary contributions to a public good, the paper
is more closely related to analyses of strategic behavior prior to public goods
games. By making observed choices prior to the actual contribution game,
players may change their co-players’ contribution behavior in a way that is
advantageous for them. In particular, five diﬀerent strategic choices have
been analyzed:
Konrad (1994) considers wealth or income in the actual contribution stage
as the strategic variable. He shows that individuals have an incentive to re-
duce their disposable income. The resulting reduction of the own contribu-
tion increases the marginal utility of the public good which leads to larger
contributions of the other individuals.
Robledo (1999) analyzes whether players may strategically abstain from
purchasing insurance. The underlying eﬀect in his framework is related to
Konrad (1994): the insurance decision changes the expected marginal util-
ity of income. He shows that, under the assumption of prudence, a player
may prefer higher uncertainty because of the eﬀect on both players’ marginal
utility that follows a desired stabilization of private consumption. It is inter-
esting to see that very diﬀerent instruments (early expenditure on the one
hand, and insurance purchases on the other hand) can have rather similar
strategic eﬀects.
Furthermore, several papers consider the strategic role of contribution
cost. Buchholz et al. (1998) show that low productivity agents have a strate-
gic advantage in the contribution game. A similar eﬀect arises in Konrad
and Lommerud (1995) who study non-cooperative provision of family public
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goods. In the context of environmental public goods, Buchholz and Konrad
(1994) show that investments in technology that lower the contribution cost
may be reduced for strategic reasons. Having high contribution cost corre-
sponds to a low public good valuation in our model. However, we do not
allow countries to manipulate this valuation. The strategic behavior that we
may observe consists in the choice of information about the cost of global
warming.
Buchholz et al. (2005) analyze the role of the institutional structure for
the provision of international public goods. In their model, citizens may
strategically vote for a government with low preferences for the public good
in order to improve the government’s bargaining position.
The strategic role of transfers is considered by Vicary (1990), Buchholz
and Konrad (1995), and Ihori (1996). The latter two papers focus on uncon-
ditional transfers in a framework with productivity diﬀerentials. The incen-
tive for such transfers emerges if individuals have diﬀerent costs of making
contributions. Vicary (1990) studies voluntary income transfers from rich to
poor individuals in a weakest-link model where the supply of the public good
is determined by the lowest contribution.
Our work departs from these papers by focusing on the choice of infor-
mation as a strategic variable. There may be an incentive to disregard in-
formation that is available at zero cost. The observability of the information
constitutes a strategic disadvantage if high preferences for the public good are
revealed. In this sense, the strategic eﬀect is similar to the strategic voting in
Buchholz et al. (2005). However, in our model, countries cannot choose their
valuation in the upcoming private provision game, but they can only decide
on the information about this country-specific value. Hence, in contrast to
the papers above, the strategic behavior does not necessarily result in an
advantage in the contribution game since the outcome of the information
acquisition is stochastic. This allows us to study the trade-oﬀ between the
possibility of optimizing the individual contribution on the one hand, and the
eﬀect on the other country’s behavior on the other hand. Moreover, we are
able to analyze the strategic interactions of the countries’ information choices
since the optimal decisions will depend on the other country’s choice and on
the relative benefit compared to the other country. By including informa-
tion acquisition, we try to explain strategic considerations in the countries’
behavior with respect to climate research.
We proceed as follows: the next section describes the model, and section
3 characterizes the equilibrium of the private provision game. Drawing on
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the continuation payoﬀs in the public goods game, section 4 analyzes the
incentives for information acquisition and implications for welfare. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
2 The formal framework
Consider two countries 1 and 2.4 Each of them allocates a given wealth wi
between private consumption xi and a contribution gi ≥ 0 to a public good.
Total contributions sum up to g1+g2 = G. The use of this aggregation tech-
nology reflects the substitutability of countries’ reductions of CO2 emissions.
The countries’ preferences are described by payoﬀ functions
Ui (xi, G) = xi + αiϕ (G) , i = 1, 2 (1)
where the payoﬀ depends on own private consumption and the total quantity
of the public good. Contribution costs are normalized to one. The function
ϕ is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, ϕ0 > 0, ϕ00 < 0. A key
variable is αi, the weight that a country i gives to the benefit from the public
good. This weight is idiosyncractic and describes the only diﬀerence between
the countries with respect to their preferences. For this reason we say that
αi is country i’s valuation or type. Referring back to the case of climate
change, country i’s contribution gi can be interpreted as the eﬀort invested
in the abatement of CO2 emissions (in monetary terms) whereas ϕ is the
technology that translates worldwide eﬀorts into an economic value attached
to the resulting mitigation of global warming. The country-specific part of
this economic value is then expressed by the multiplier αi.5
Quasilinearity is assumed because it bears out the strategic implications
of information acquisition most strongly. As in partial equilibrium analysis,
quasilinear preferences map the absence of income eﬀects and are a natural
assumption in the case of global warming relying on the fact that countries
spend only a small portion of their total expenditures on climate protection.
Qualitatively, our results do not depend on this specification.
4The two-country case already identifies the eﬀects of information acquisition which
are also present in the case of N countries. With more than two countries, however,
the number of diﬀerent cases which have to be taken into account in section 4 increases
exponentially.
5Thus, the relationship between the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere and global
temperatures is - via ϕ - assumed to be known and common to all countries. The focus is
on the country-specific benefit of a mitigation of global warming.
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Ex ante, the countries are uncertain about the individual benefit they
derive from the supply of the public good. Both countries know the probabil-
ity distribution of their own valuation and of the other country’s valuation.
The prior distribution of country i’s type is denoted by Fi (αi) with type
space [0, αmax).6 The countries’ types are assumed to be independent: cli-
mate change probably causes high social cost for some (developing) countries
while other countries may even benefit from global warming.
Prior to the contribution game, each country has to decide whether to
receive a signal about its valuation before entering into the private provision
game. This information acquisition does not involve a direct cost, and the
information is publicly observable: if i acquires information, then both coun-
tries will update their beliefs about i’s valuation αi in the same way. Hence,
there is no private information about a specific country’s cost of global warm-
ing.
Without losing any valuable insight, we concentrate on the case where
the types α1 and α2 are drawn independently from binary probability distri-
butions F1 and F2. Furthermore, information acquisition is assumed to yield
a perfectly informative signal on the own type.7 This specification facilitates
the exposition substantially without influencing the results qualitatively, and
it strongly emphasizes the diﬀerent eﬀects of information acquisition which
also emerge for a more general distribution of types. Accordingly, let
αi ∈ {li, hi} , li < hi,
Pr (αi = hi) = pi, Pr (αi = li) = 1− pi, i = 1, 2 .
(2)
Note that if country i decides not to acquire information, both countries will
have to choose their contributions based on the common prior about αi.
6Our analysis will concentrate on two-point distributions of types. The upper bound
of the support is used to avoid corner solutions where wealth constraints are binding, i.e.
the entire expenditures of a country are on climate protection. αi ≥ 0 corresponds to the
assumption of gi ≥ 0 as it is standard in models of public goods provision.
7Considering the cost of global warming, the assumption of a perfectly informative
signal seems to be extreme. In the case of quasilinear preferences, this reduced form can
be deduced from a more general information structure assuming a binary signal si ∈ Si
where country i’s signal space Si = {Li,Hi}. Let Fi : [0, αmax) × Si → [0, 1] be the joint
probability distribution of the valuation αi and the signal si. (Assuming that the cost
of information acquisition is zero, we are not required to restrict this distribution on the
eﬀort invested in information and the information precision, respectively.) Given a signal
si, countries update their beliefs, and they base their contributions on the conditional
expected value of their type which can thus be defined as li := E (αi|si = Li) and hi :=
E (αi|si = Hi).
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The timing of the game is as follows: In stage 1, each country decides
whether to acquire information about its valuation. The decisions are made
simultaneously. At the beginning of stage 2, the decisions of the two coun-
tries and the outcomes of the stage 1 decisions become publicly known, and
both countries simultaneously choose their contributions to the public good.
A strategy of a country i therefore consists of the probability of acquiring
information in stage 1, denoted by πi ∈ [0, 1], and a contribution gi in stage
2, conditioned on the information revealed at the beginning of stage 2. To
solve for the equilibria of the game, we use the concept of subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
3 The private provision subgame
We first characterize the private provision equilibrium for given valuations re-
sulting from the decisions in stage 1. As in the standard approach (Bergstrom
et al., 1986), each country i maximizes
wi − gi +Aiϕ (gi +G−i)
subject to the budget constraint xi + gi ≤ wi and gi ≥ 0. (G−i are the
aggregate contributions of the countries other than i.) Here, Ai ∈ [0, αmax) is
i’s valuation of the public good. This valuation depends on whether or not
i acquired information. If country i acquired information, Ai is equal to its
true valuation. Otherwise, maximization of the expected payoﬀ reduces to
an analogous problem with Ai being the ex ante expected value of αi.8
Taking the quasilinear payoﬀ functions into consideration, the solution to
this problem is straightforward. Define the stand-alone quantity Γ(Ai) of the
public good for a valuation Ai as the solution to the first order condition
Aiϕ
0 (Γ(Ai)) = 1 for i = 1, 2 . (3)
Note that this is the quantity of the public good that i would be willing
to contribute on its own if G−i = 0, given its valuation Ai and provided
that its wealth is suﬃciently large. It follows from monotonicity and strict
concavity of ϕ that Γ is well-defined and strictly increasing in its argument
with Γ (0) = 0 and Γ (A) = (ϕ0)−1
¡
1
A
¢
for A > 0.
8This is due to the multiplicative payoﬀ structure. Hence, the analysis for a general
distribution of types is similar to our approach.
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We will generally assume that wi is never a binding constraint, i.e., we
assume that wi ≥ Γ(αmax).9 Then, the equilibrium contributions are well-
known to be
g∗1 = Γ(A1) and g
∗
2 = 0 if A1 > A2 ,
g∗1 = 0 and g
∗
2 = Γ(A2) if A1 < A2 .
(4)
If A1 = A2, then any vector (g1, g2) ∈ [0,Γ(A1)]2 with g1 + g2 = Γ(A1)
is an equilibrium. (4) characterizes the solution to the private provision
game for general values of A1 and A2. For the equilibrium, it does not
matter whether Ai is an expected value or the true value of the public good
valuation for country i. Thus, (4) describes the equilibrium outcome for
the four possible information situations in which none of the countries have
acquired information, only country 1 or country 2 has acquired information,
or both countries have acquired information.
4 The incentives for information acquisition
Suppose in the following that E (α1) < E (α2).10 Let mi := E (αi) , i = 1, 2.
Additionally, we will use the short form notation ΓAi := Γ(Ai). As regards
the distribution of types, the strategic considerations are strongest if
max (l1, l2) < mi < min (h1, h2) , i = 1, 2 , (5)
i.e. the expected value of a country i lies between the two potential valuations
of the other country.11 We will proceed in two steps. First, we determine the
best response of a country to a given pure strategy of its opponent. (Recall
that πi = 1 implies that i will uncover its true valuation with probability 1.)
Second, we determine the value of information and characterize the set of
equilibria for the two-stage game.
9The case wi < max{Γ(A1),Γ(A2)} is also straightforward. Wealth constraints change
the problem in a way that is interesting and related to the problem we study, and we refer
back to this case in the next section.
10If types are drawn independently from a CDF F and hence E (α1) = E (α2), we
have to select an equilibrium of the contribution stage when countries have the same
(expected) valuation. Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium, the exposition is similar to
the asymmetric case without producing crucial diﬀerences.
11If for instance h1 < l2, information acquisition of one country does not cause an
externality on the contribution of the other country: independent of stage 1, only country
2 will contribute in equilibrium.
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One-sided information acquisition. First of all, consider the best re-
sponse of a country to the opponent choosing to remain uninformed. Observe
that due to E (α1) < E (α2), only country 2 will contribute to the public good
if both countries remain uninformed.
Country 1. Suppose π2 = 0. With (4) and (5), it follows that equilib-
rium contributions are g∗1 = Γ (h1) and g
∗
2 = 0 if country 1 uncovers a high
value. Otherwise, if country 1 is informed of a low valuation, g∗1 = 0 and
g∗2 = Γ (m2). Therefore, expected payoﬀ conditional on π1 and prior to the
observation of the signal is equal to
EU1 (π1|π2 = 0) = (1− π1) {w1 +m1ϕ (Γm2)}
+π1{(1− p1) [w1 + l1ϕ (Γm2)]
+ p1 [w1 − Γh1 + h1ϕ (Γh1)]}. (6)
The first term in (6) describes country 1’s expected payoﬀ if, in stage 2,
it is uninformed, and the second term distinguishes between the possible
outcomes in case of information acquisition of country 1. π∗1 = 1 if and only
if the derivative of (6) with respect to π1,
∆π2=01 :=
∂EU1 (π1|π2 = 0)
∂π1
= p1 [h1ϕ (Γh1)− Γh1 − h1ϕ (Γm2)] (7)
is positive (since (6) is linear in π1). Therefore, ∆
π2=0
1 is equal to the value
of information of country 1 given π2 = 0,
∆π2=01 ≡ EU1 (π1 = 1|π2 = 0)−EU1 (π1 = 0|π2 = 0) .
Let us examine∆π2=01 more closely. With probability 1−p1, neither the supply
of the public good nor country 1’s contribution change. With probability p1,
country 1 has to pay for the provision of the public good. However, it can
adjust the supply of the public good to its individually optimal quantity. The
following properties are straightforward to verify.
Observation 1 The value of information of country 1 given π2 = 0 is
(i) negative if h1 is suﬃciently close to m2 (limh1↓m2 ∆
π2=0
1 = −Γh1 < 0);
(ii) increasing and convex in h1.
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Define a threshold hˆ > m2 such that hˆϕ (Γhˆ)− Γhˆ − hˆϕ (Γm2) = 0. From
Observation 1, it follows that country 1’s best response to π2 = 0 is to acquire
information if and only if h1 > hˆ.12
Country 2. Equivalent to the case of country 1, if π2 > 0, country 2’s
expected payoﬀ depends on the realization of the signal about its valuation,
EU2 (π2|π1 = 0) = (1− π2) {w2 − Γm2 +m2ϕ (Γm2)}
+π2{(1− p2) [w2 + l2ϕ (Γm1)]
+ p2 [w2 − Γh2 + h2ϕ (Γh2)]}. (8)
Diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to π2 yields
∆π1=02 : = (1− p2) [l2ϕ (Γm1)− (l2ϕ (Γm2)− Γm2)]
+p2 [(h2ϕ (Γh2)− Γh2)− (h2ϕ (Γm2)− Γm2)] . (9)
Together with Observation 1, examination of the sign of (9) leads to the
following result.
Lemma 1 Suppose that E (α1) < E (α2) and (5) holds. Then, (i) if country
1 does not acquire information, country 2 always prefers to uncover its valu-
ation, and (ii) if country 2 does not acquire information, country 1 uncovers
its valuation if and only if ∆π2=01 > 0.
Proof. Iﬀ ∆π2=01 > 0, country 1 can increase its expected payoﬀ by in-
creasing π1. This shows (ii). Part (i) is true since (9) is positive for all
(m1, p2, l2, h2) satisfying (5). This follows from monotonicity of ϕ and an
optimality argument: if A2 denotes the (expected) type of country 2, by
definition of Γ,
A2ϕ (Γ (A2))− Γ (A2) > A2ϕ (Γ (k))− Γ (k) for all k 6= A2. (10)
Hence, the second term in (9) is positive. The first term is larger than
[(l2ϕ (Γm1)− Γm1)− (l2ϕ (Γm2)− Γm2)] which is positive since l2 < m1 < m2
and l2ϕ (G)−G is strictly decreasing in G for all G > Γl2 .
12Note that this threshold only depends on E (α2). Therefore, for a general probability
distribution, this result carries over to a similar condition which depends on the mass of
types α1 > hˆ compared to types α1 ∈
³
m2, hˆ
´
.
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Without direct cost of information, there is no equilibrium where both
countries do not acquire information (π1 = π2 = 0). Lemma 1 already
determines the equilibrium strategies in a situation where only one country
would have the possibility of investing in information about its benefit of
the mitigation of global warming. (Alternatively, this situation could arise
if one country’s cost of information were very high.) Furthermore, Lemma
1 applies when one country’s valuation, i.e. its cost of global warming, is
publicly known.
In the one-sided decision problem, country 2 always prefers to learn its
valuation. Obviously, it cannot be worse oﬀ, since, without additional infor-
mation, the other country contributes zero in the second stage. However, if
it did receive a high signal, it would be able to improve its own contribution.
This adjustment eﬀect increases its payoﬀ. Learning a low valuation would
even shift the full burden of provision to the other country. We refer to
this eﬀect as a strategic eﬀect. Both eﬀects increase the payoﬀ of country 2.
Contrarily, if country 1 reveals a high valuation, its opponent reduces its con-
tribution to zero. In particular, if h1 is only slightly larger than m2, country
1 has an incentive to remain uninformed due to this negative strategic eﬀect.
Only if h1 is considerably higher than m2, can the improved quantity choice
of G outweigh the fact that the provision is now fully paid for by itself. In the
latter case, the gain from the adjustment of the own contribution dominates
the negative strategic eﬀect.
Best response to information acquisition. Now suppose that πj = 1
and consider a country i’s expected payoﬀ dependent on πi. Here, it is crucial
to distinguish whether its potential valuations hi and li are larger or smaller
than hj and lj, respectively.13
Case A: li < lj, hi < hj
Let us first analyze the decision of a country i whose potential valuations
are lower than the other country’s valuations. Figure 1 illustrates the mar-
ginal benefit of the public good supply (αϕ0 (G)) dependent on the potential
valuations αi and αj. A country’s stand-alone supply is then determined such
that this marginal benefit is equal to the marginal contribution cost (which
is constant). From these quantities, the equilibrium contributions for the
13Recall that (5) is still assumed to hold. The distinction of whether l1 is larger than l2
does not change the analysis qualitatively. We will address this issue again later.
11
 G  
( )Gϕα ′  
( )jlΓ  ( )ilΓ  ( )jhΓ  ( )ihΓ  
ih=α  
jh=α  
il=α  
jl=α  
1 
Figure 1: Best response to πj = 1 : Case A
potential outcomes of the information acquisition can be deduced. Expected
payoﬀ EUi (πi | πj = 1) is equal to
(1− πi) {(1− pj) [wi − Γmi +miϕ (Γmi)] + pj
£
wi +miϕ
¡
Γhj
¢¤}
+ πi{(1− pi) (1− pj)
£
wi + liϕ
¡
Γlj
¢¤
+ (1− pi) pj
£
wi + liϕ
¡
Γhj
¢¤
+ pi (1− pj) [wi − Γhi + hiϕ (Γhi)] + pipj
£
wi + hiϕ
¡
Γhj
¢¤}. (11)
In order to determine the optimal choice of πi, i has to take into account the
possible outcomes of the information acquisition (drawing on the probabilities
pi and pj). Deriving (11) with respect to πi yields
∆πj=1i;hi<hj : = (1− pi) (1− pj)
£
liϕ
¡
Γlj
¢
− (liϕ (Γmi)− Γmi)
¤
+ pi (1− pj) [(hiϕ (Γhi)− Γhi)− (hiϕ (Γmi)− Γmi)] (12)
which, using the same optimality argument as in the proof of Lemma 1(i),
is strictly larger than zero. Hence, if hi < hj, country i’s best response to
πj = 1 is to increase πi up to 1. With probability pj, the opponent has a
high valuation, and, due to hi < hj, the equilibrium contributions (g∗i = 0,
g∗j = Γhj) do not depend on the stage 1 decision of i. If αj = lj, country i
pays for the provision if it chooses not to learn its type. Therefore, it is better
oﬀ by uncovering its value, since, with probability pi, it is able to adjust the
12
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Figure 2: Best response to πj = 1 : Case B
supply of the public good to Γhi, and with probability 1− pi, the opponent
will provide the public good.14
Case B: li > lj, hi > hj
Now turn to the case where country i’s possible valuations are higher than
lj and hj, respectively. (Figure 2 illustrates the stand-alone supply resulting
from the assumption on the location of the potential valuations.) The value
of information for πj = 1 is given by
∆πj=1i;hi>hj : = (1− pi) (1− pj) [(liϕ (Γli)− Γli)− (liϕ (Γmi)− Γmi)]
+pi (1− pj) [(hiϕ (Γhi)− Γhi)− (hiϕ (Γmi)− Γmi)]
+pipj
£
hiϕ (Γhi)− Γhi − hiϕ
¡
Γhj
¢¤
. (13)
The first two summands are positive: if the other country has a low value,
additional information always improves the individual contribution.15 How-
ever, the third summand can be negative: if country j has a high valuation,
14This follows from the assumption of li < lj . With li > lj , country i would also gain in
the latter case (both have a low value) due to the reduction of its contribution from Γmi
to Γli .
15If li < lj , ∆
πj=1
i;hi>hj
increases by (1− pi) (1− pj)
£
Γli + liϕ
¡
Γlj
¢
− liϕ (Γli)
¤
> 0. The
following arguments are still valid.
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country i may want to avoid to uncover a high valuation itself. Comparative
statics analysis shows the following:
Observation 2 If hi > hj and πj = 1, country i’s value of information
(i) decreases in pj;
(ii) increases in hi and decreases in li
(limhi↓mi,li↑mi, hi>hj ∆
πj=1
i;hi>hj
= −pipjΓmi < 0).
If it is more likely that the other country has a high value (i.e. pj is
large), the incentive of uncovering the own value diminishes. Moreover, if
the diﬀerence between hi and li is suﬃciently small, potential gains from an
adjustment of the individual contribution are limited, and country i’s value of
information is negative: the negative strategic eﬀect outweighs the increase
in the payoﬀ in case of αj = lj. But, as in the one-sided information decision
of country 1, there exists a critical threshold hˇ > hj such that the third
summand in (13) is positive iﬀ hi > hˇ. Hence, hi > hˇ is a suﬃcient condition
for ∆πj=1i;hi>hj > 0.
We omit the cases where the value of information is exactly zero and a
country is just indiﬀerent between investing and not investing in information.
The following proposition then describes equilibrium play in stage 1. (Equi-
librium contributions conditional on the history of the game up to stage 2
are characterized in (4).)
Proposition 1 Suppose that E (α1) < E (α2) and (5) holds.
Case 1 If h1 > h2, in the unique equilibrium, country 2 acquires informa-
tion; country 1 invests in information if and only if ∆π2=11;h1>h2 > 0.
Case 2 If h1 < h2 and
(a) ∆π1=12;h2>h1 > 0, in the unique equilibrium both country uncover their value;
(b) ∆π1=12;h2>h1 < 0: If ∆
π2=0
1 > 0, there is a unique equilibrium where in stage
1 only country 1 uncovers its value and country 2 remains uninformed.
Otherwise, if ∆π2=01 < 0, the unique equilibrium involves mixed strate-
gies and π∗1 =
∆
π1=0
2
∆
π1=0
2 −∆
π1=1
2;h2>h1
, π∗2 =
−∆π2=01
−∆π2=01 +∆
π2=1
1;h1<h2
.
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For the proof, we refer to the appendix. Case 2 is summarized in the
following table.
h1 < h2 ∆
π1=1
2;h1<h2 > 0 ∆
π1=1
2;h1<h2 < 0
∆π2=01;h1<h2 > 0 (π
∗
1 = 1 , π
∗
2 = 1) (π
∗
1 = 1 , π
∗
2 = 0)
∆π2=01;h1<h2 < 0 (π
∗
1 = 1 , π
∗
2 = 1) mixed
Table 1: Equilibrium play in stage 1 (Case 2)
The equilibrium of the two-stage game is unique. As the above analysis
shows, it crucially depends on the underlying probability distributions F1 and
F2, i.e. on the potential valuations and on the probabilities of the diﬀerent
outcomes. Further specification of some of these values will determine which
of the two eﬀects of information acquisition prevails. Note that ∆πj=1i;hi>hj < 0
is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for country i (with hi > hj) to remain
uninformed with positive probability.
Proposition 1 points out that the equilibrium may involve the strategic
choice of uncertainty of one country. In particular, if the distributions of
types are similar, the risk of worsening the own strategic position in the
following private provision game may dominate a potential improvement of
the own contribution due to information acquisition. The country that then
chooses not to uncover its valuation in order to evade the burden of provision
is the one whose upper valuation, h, is greater than the upper valuation of
the other country. Hence, the country that potentially attaches the largest
economic value to CO2 reductions might decide not to invest in additional
information about its true valuation and, as a result, might not contribute
to the public good.16
Welfare considerations. Proposition 1 states conditions under which in
equilibrium at least one country does not acquire information with proba-
bility 1. This strategic incentive may lead to additional ineﬃciencies. From
16In the previous analysis, we assumed throughout that the budget constraints of the
countries are never binding. Suppose that both countries uncover a high valuation and
Γ (hi) > wi for both i = 1, 2. If e.g. h1 > h2, equilibrium contributions of stage 2 are
g∗1 = w1, g
∗
2 = min (w2,Γh2 − w1). Hence, the country with the strategic disadvantage in
the private provision game is still the country with the higher h. However, on the one
hand, potential gains from an increase in the supply of the public good are restricted. On
the other hand, there is no complete free-riding if both countries uncover a high value.
Hence, the impact of these two additional eﬀects on the equilibrium will depend on the
particular values of w1 and w2.
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an ex ante point of view, welfare may be lower than if both countries had
chosen to uncover their valuation.
Due to the quasilinearity of the payoﬀ functions, the welfare analysis can
concentrate on the aggregate surplus,
S (α1, α2, G) =
X
i=1,2
αiϕ (G)−G . (14)
Thus, the Pareto eﬃcient outcome is equal to G0 (α1, α2) = Γα1+α2. Note
that, by assumption, costs of information are zero and do not aﬀect welfare.
A priori, it is not clear whether information acquisition is welfare enhanc-
ing. To illustrate the impact of information on welfare, let us first consider
the aggregate surplus ex post, i.e. depending on the true valuations of the
countries. As a benchmark, we compare the two cases where either no coun-
try acquires information or both countries acquire information.
Observation 3 With information acquisition, aggregate surplus ex post
(i) always increases if at least one country uncovers a high value;
(ii) decreases if and only if both countries uncover a low value and
(l1 + l2)ϕ
¡
Γmax{l1,l2}
¢
− Γmax{l1,l2} < (l1 + l2)ϕ (Γm2)− Γm2 . (15)
Observation 3 identifies two potential welfare eﬀects of information acqui-
sition. On the one hand, additional information improves the eﬃciency of the
individual contributions. Moreover, uncovering a high value is always wel-
fare enhancing since G0 (hi, αj) ≥ Γhi > Γm2, i.e. the equilibrium supply of
the public good is closer to the eﬃcient supply independent of the valuation
of the other country, αj (Observation 3(i)). On the other hand, aggregate
surplus can be higher without information acquisition if an uninformed coun-
try overcontributes from its point of view. This overcontribution eﬀect may
improve eﬃciency if the true valuation of both countries is low (Observation
3(ii)). A suﬃcient condition for (15) to be fulfilled is l1 + l2 > m2.
Thus, from an ex ante point of view, if p1 and p2 are suﬃciently small, pre-
venting countries from becoming informed could be welfare improving: the
chance that the uncertainty over the valuations alleviates the underprovi-
sion overcompensates the welfare gain which results from uncovering a high
16
benefit of the mitigation of global warming.17 However, we can formulate
(suﬃcient) conditions such that a strategic decision to remain uninformed
always has a negative impact on welfare, and therefore, a social planner (or
supranational institution) would like to induce information acquisition. Un-
der these conditions, the positive eﬀect of information always dominates a
potential decrease in welfare as in Observation 3(ii), and the resulting overall
eﬀect is independent of the probabilities attached to the potential outcomes.
Proposition 2 A strategic choice to remain uninformed negatively aﬀects
ex ante welfare if one of the following conditions holds:
(C1) Γ (A) is convex in A;
(C2) min {l1, l2} = 0.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. If the function determining a
country’s stand-alone quantity is convex in the valuation, the gain from an
adjustment of the individual contributions is strong enough to outweigh a
potential welfare gain from an overcontribution at the individual level, re-
gardless of the probability of the two events. Therefore, a choice to remain
uninformed decreases the eﬃciency of the outcome. It is straightforward to
verify that (C1) is fulfilled e.g. for ϕ (G) = Gγ, 0 < γ < 1.
The intuition for (C1) builds on the observation that convexity of Γ (Ai)
implies convexity of the supply G (because of G = max {Γ (A1) ,Γ (A2)}).
Therefore, the expected value of G over the possible realizations of the val-
uations is larger than the supply of the public good based on the expected
valuations. This, in turn, increases ex ante welfare. If (C2) holds, the supply
of the public good is Pareto eﬃcient if both countries uncover a low value:
the overcontribution eﬀect potentially reduces welfare. Thus, under (C1) or
(C2), welfare would be highest if both countries uncovered their true valu-
ation. The provision of information about the valuations by a third party
would be welfare enhancing.
Although (C1) or (C2) may be reasonable assumptions in many cases,
there can be situations where both conditions are violated. Consider for
example ϕ (G) = 1 − exp (−G). We get Γ (Ai) = − ln
³
1
Ai
´
if Ai ≥ 1, and
17Note that we still concentrate on (non-cooperative) private provision of the public
good. If a social planner could prescribe the contributions of the countries, he would
always prefer to uncover the true valuations.
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hence, (C1) is not fulfilled. Dependent on the fundamentals of the model,
both countries prefer to acquire information, but preventing one country
from becoming informed would be welfare enhancing.18 In the appendix, we
provide an example with concrete parameter values which lead to excessive
information acquisition. Summing up, we get:
Claim 1 If both (C1) and (C2) are violated, there can be too much informa-
tion acquisition in equilibrium.
If Γ (Ai) is strictly concave and, in addition, the probabilities for low
values are suﬃciently large, the uncertainty leads with large probability to
an overcontribution at the individual level. Thus, it might be the case that
a social planner would prefer not to provide the information although it is
available at no cost. From an ex ante point of view, being uninformed will
then influence in a positive way a country’s contribution to the mitigation of
global warming.
5 Conclusion
Free-riding behavior may not be the only type of ineﬃciency that arises in
the private provision of public goods. Starting from a standard public goods
game, we showed that the strategic choice of information prior to the inter-
action has a substantial impact on the outcome. An important example for
a privately provided public good is the mitigation of global warming. Tak-
ing into account decisions about information acquisition gives consideration
to the important role of information and uncertainty regarding the country-
specific eﬀorts to reduce the emissions of carbon dioxide.
In this paper we have concentrated on the acquisition of information in
the context of environmental public goods where the information was related
to the idiosyncratic benefit of the mitigation of global warming. We identi-
fied conditions under which countries prefer to remain uninformed of their
valuation even if they do not have to pay for the information. A crucial
assumption underlying this strategic incentive is the observability of the out-
come of the information acquisition. It maps the nature of investments in
18Information acquisition of country 1 always leads to a welfare gain compared to no
information acquisition because uncovering a low value does not aﬀect the supply G.
Hence, preventing both countries from information acquisition can never be optimal.
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information in the case of global warming where additional information is
obtained via scientific reports estimating the country-specific cost of climate
change.
In order to facilitate the exposition, we restricted our analysis to a two-
point probability distribution. The two eﬀects of information acquisition
identified in this case carry over to a general probability distribution: Addi-
tional information leads to an increase in the individual payoﬀ because the
own contribution can be adjusted. However, it bears a strategic risk since
it aﬀects the contributions of the other countries. The latter eﬀect can be
negative and, from an ex ante point of view, it can outweigh a potential
adjustment gain.
We determined two suﬃcient conditions under which the resulting strate-
gic information choice has a negative impact on welfare when, in equilibrium,
a country decides not to acquire information. Therefore, the provision of in-
formation on a supranational level can increase the eﬃciency of the outcome
of the interaction. This result may justify the eﬀorts made by suprana-
tional institutions with regard to climate research. But given that these two
conditions are violated, welfare could be higher if one country remained un-
informed. Too high contributions from the individual point of view that are
caused by uncertainty can alleviate the underprovision problem.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Case 1 is immediate because, due to Lemma 1 and∆π1=12;h2<h1 > 0, country 2 has
a strictly dominant strategy to uncover its value. (Note that ∆π1=12;h2<h1 refers
to (12)). The same holds for Case 2(a). In Case 2(b), if ∆π2=01 > 0, country
1 has a strictly dominant strategy to uncover its value. Due to ∆π1=12;h2>h1 < 0,
2’s best response to π∗1 = 1 is indeed π
∗
2 = 0. In these three cases, uniqueness
follows from iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.
The most interesting case is ∆π1=12;h2>h1 < 0 and ∆
π2=0
1 < 0. First of all,
there can be no equilibrium in pure strategies. Intuitively, in stage 1, country
1 always prefers to choose the same action as country 2 whereas country 2
uncovers its value if and only if 1 does not learn. Thus, consider equilibria
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in mixed strategies. Country 1 randomizes according to π∗1 if and only if
∂EU1 (π | π2 = π∗2) /∂π = (1− π∗2)∆π2=01 + π∗2∆π2=11;h1<h2
!
= 0. (16)
(16) is solved uniquely for π∗2 =
¡
−∆π2=01
¢
/
¡
−∆π2=01 +∆π2=11;h1<h2
¢
which is
strictly between 0 and 1. Analogously, π∗1 =
¡
∆π1=02
¢
/
¡
∆π1=02 −∆π1=12;h2>h1
¢
∈
(0, 1) in the unique equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Note that whenever ∆πj=1i;hi>hj < 0, either i remains uninformed or the equi-
librium is in mixed strategies. We start with the proof for the first type of
equilibrium. The argument carries over to the corresponding outcome of the
randomization in the mixed strategy equilibrium. Examine
∆E [S] := E [S (αi, αj, G) |πi = 1, πj = 1]−E [S (αi, αj, G) |πi = 0, πj = 1] .
With simple transformations, we get
∆E [S] = (1− pj)
£
(1− pi)S
¡
li, lj,Γmax{li,lj}
¢
+ piS (hi, lj,Γhi)− S (mi, lj,Γmi)
¤
+pipj
£
S
¡
hi, hj,Γmax{hi,hj}
¢
− S
¡
hi, hj,Γhj
¢¤
The second term is non-negative. (It is positive in the pure strategy equilib-
rium due to hi > hj.) The first term is positive for all pi iﬀ S
¡
Ai, lj,Γmax{Ai,lj}
¢
is convex in Ai. If Ai > lj, deriving S
¡
Ai, lj,Γmax{Ai,lj}
¢
with respect to Ai
yields
∂S
¡
Ai, lj,Γmax{Ai,lj}
¢
∂Ai
= ϕ (ΓAi) +
lj
Ai
Γ0 (Ai) ,
∂2S
¡
Ai, lj,Γmax{Ai,lj}
¢
∂A2i
=
Γ0 (Ai)
Ai
µ
1− lj
Ai
¶
+
lj
Ai
Γ00 (Ai) .
For Ai < lj, ∂S
¡
Ai, lj,Γmax{Ai,lj}
¢
/∂Ai is constant and smaller than the
slope of S for Ai > lj. Thus, (C1) is a suﬃcient condition for convexity of
S
¡
Ai, lj,Γmax{Ai,lj}
¢
and hence for ∆E [S] being strictly positive if in equi-
librium only i remained uninformed.
For the mixed strategy equilibrium, it remains to show that under com-
plete information welfare is higher than if both countries remained unin-
formed. Note first that information acquisition of country 1 is always welfare
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improving if country 2 remains uninformed: learning a low value has no ef-
fect on the supply of the public good, but uncovering a high value is welfare
enhancing. Set i = 2 in the case where only country i remained uninformed.
This completes the proof of (C1) for the mixed strategy equilibrium.
(C2) follows directly from Observation 3(i) and the fact that (15) is vio-
lated if min {l1, l2} = 0.
A.3 Proof of Claim 1
Concerning the occurrence of excessive information acquisition, consider as
example ϕ (G) = 1− exp (−G) . We get
Γ (Ai) =
(
0 if Ai < 1
− ln
³
1
Ai
´
if Ai ≥ 1
,
and hence, (C1) is violated since Γ00 (Ai) = −1/A2i < 0. If for instance
l1 = 3, l2 = 2.8, h1 = 8, h2 = 10, p1 = p2 = 0.2,
we get ∆π1=12;h2>h1 ≈ 0.75 > 0, and both countries acquire information in stage
1. Computation of the expected surplus dependent on π1 and π2 yields
E [S|π1 = π2 = 1] ≈ 5.01, E [S|π1 = 1, π2 = 0] ≈ 5.00,
E [S|π1 = 0, π2 = 1] ≈ 5.03, E [S|π1 = π2 = 0] ≈ 4.85.
A social planner would set π1 = 0 and π2 = 1.
References
[1] Andreoni, J., 1988. Privately provided public goods in a large economy:
the limits of altruism. Journal of Public Economics 35, 57-73.
[2] Andreoni, J., McGuire, M., 1993. Identifying the free riders: a simple
algorithm for determining who will contribute to a public good. Journal
of Public Economics 51, 447-454.
[3] Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., Varian, H., 1986. On the private provision of
public goods. Journal of Public Economics 29, 25-49.
21
[4] Buchholz, W., Haupt, A., Peters, W., 2005. International environmental
agreements and strategic voting. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107
(1), 175-195.
[5] Buchholz, W., Konrad, K.A., 1994. Global environmental problems and
the strategic choice of technology. Journal of Economics — Zeitschrift für
Nationalökonomie 60, 299-321.
[6] Buchholz, W., Konrad, K.A., 1995. Strategic transfers and private pro-
vision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 57, 489-505.
[7] Buchholz, W., Nett, L., Peters, W., 1998. The strategic advantage of
being less skilled. Economics Letters 60, 35-39.
[8] Caplan, A.J., Ellis, C.J., Silva, E.C.D., 1999. Winners and losers in a
world with global warming: noncooperation, altruism, and social wel-
fare. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 37, 256-271.
[9] Cornes, R., Sandler, T., 1984. Easy riders, joint production, and public
goods. Economic Journal 94, 580-598.
[10] Cornes, R., Sandler, T., 1985. The simple analytics of pure public good
provision. Economica 52, 103-116.
[11] Fredriksson, P.G., Gaston, N., 2000. Ratification of the 1992 climate
change convention: what determines legislative delay? Public Choice
104, 345-368.
[12] Hoel, M., 1991. Global environmental problems: the eﬀects of unilateral
actions taken by one country. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 20, 55-70.
[13] Ihori, T., 1996. International public goods and contribution productivity
diﬀerentials. Journal of Public Economics 61, 139-154.
[14] Konrad, K.A., 1994. The strategic advantage of being poor: private and
public provision of public goods. Economica 61, 79-92.
[15] Konrad, K.A., Lommerud, K.E., 1995. Family policy with non-
cooperative families. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 97 (4), 581-
601.
22
[16] McGuire, M., 1974. Group size, group homogeneity, and the aggregate
provision of a pure public good under Cournot behavior. Public Choice
18, 107-126.
[17] McKibbin, W.J., Wilcoxen, P.J., 2002. The role of economics in climate
change policy. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (2), 107-129.
[18] Murdoch, J.C., Sandler, T., 1997. The voluntary provision of a pure pub-
lic good: the case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol.
Journal of Public Economics 63, 331-349.
[19] Murdoch, J.C., Sandler, T., Sargent, K., 1997. A tale of two collectives:
sulphur versus nitrogen oxides emission reduction in Europe. Economica
64, 281-301.
[20] Robledo, J.R., 1999. Strategic risk taking when there is a public good
to be provided privately. Journal of Public Economics 71, 403-414.
[21] Sandler, T., 1992. Collective action: theory and applications. Ann Ar-
bor: University of Michigan Press.
[22] Sandler, T., Sterbenz, F.P., Posnett, J., 1987. Free riding and uncer-
tainty. European Economic Review 31, 1605-1617.
[23] Sandler, T., 2004. Global collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[24] Stern, N., 2006. The Stern review on the economics of climate change.
HM Treasury, UK.
[25] Vicary, S., 1990. Transfers and the weakest-link: an extension of Hirsh-
leifer’s analysis. Journal of Public Economics 43, 375-394.
[26] Warr, P.G., 1982. Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity.
Journal of Public Economics 19, 131-138.
[27] Warr, P.G., 1983. The private provision of a public good is independent
of the distribution of income. Economics Letters 13, 207-211.
23
